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Abstract
In May 2011, African Barrick Gold, owner of the North 
Mara Gold Mine in northern Tanzania, announced a plan 
to erect a three-metre-high concrete wall to enhance secur-
ity against incursions from local (displaced) populations . 
Taking this wall as both metaphorical and material, this 
paper questions the psychological impact of displacement 
on “displacers .” How does this subject avoid psychic implo-
sion? My review identifies legal infrastructure, mythologies 
of Canadian benevolence, CSR discourses, and commun-
ity consultations as operating to provide psychic scaffold-
ing for this dominant subject, who is thus inured against 
psychic distress and implosion in response to conditions of 
what can be deemed routine structural violence .
Résumé
En mai 2011, l’African Barrick Gold, propriétaire de la 
mine d’or du nord du Mara, au nord de la Tanzanie, a 
annoncé le projet de construire un mur de béton de trois 
mètres de haut afin d’augmenter la sécurité face aux 
incursions des populations locales (déplacées) . En consi-
dérant ce mur de façon matérielle et métaphorique, cet 
article soulève la question de ses impacts psychologiques 
sur ces populations de « déplacés », et demande comment 
les individus concernés éviteront « l’implosion psychique » . 
Cette étude identifie les infrastructures légales, les myth-
ologies de la bienfaisance canadienne, les discours de RSE 
et les consultations communautaires en tant que moyens 
pour fournir le soutien nécessaire pour aguerrir les sujets 
contre la détresse psychique et l’implosion en réponse à des 
conditions pouvant être considérées comme une violence 
structurelle continue .
Following the shooting in May 2011 of five Tanzanians at the perimeter of a largely Canadian-owned gold mine in northern Tanzania, the company announced 
a plan to construct around the mine site a 12-kilometre-
long, three-meter-high concrete wall,1 topped with electri-
fied barbed wire and studded with closed-circuit security 
cameras. This decision was a response to repeated con-
frontations between community residents—often artisanal 
miners—and the mine security. Effectively, a Canadian-
financed and majority-owned gold mine was established 
on Tanzanian soil from which local Tanzanian citizens and 
miners had been successively displaced, and who were now 
to be more definitively walled out. 
While much “displacement literature” focuses on the 
impact of displacement on displaced populations, the ques-
tions I want to explore pertain to the subjects inside the 
wall, both literally and figuratively: the expatriates, senior 
managers, shareholders, and investors. Casting the “walled 
mine” as a type of gated community with historical links 
to colonial-era walled forts, I draw on post-colonial and 
critical race theory to analyze “the displacer” as a neo-lib-
eral subject who operates in a contemporary zone of neo-
colonialist power relations. Psychologically, what is required 
of this subject? What psychic gymnastics does this subject 
engage in to “live with” complicity regarding conditions of 
racialized structural violence in the form of large-scale dis-
placement, loss, death, dispossession, and impoverishment 
(or exclusion from wealth) as it affects those living in the 
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vicinity of the mine? How does or can the “displacer” relate 
to “the displaced”? 
This study, which draws specifically on the experiences 
at the North Mara Gold Mine, owned by African Barrick 
Gold (ABG), in northern Tanzania, builds on previous 
research with Canadian mining professionals who had 
worked in numerous African countries. With reference to 
the North Mara gold mine, I have had no direct access to 
the Canadian, expatriate, or other managerial employees at 
the mine in question.2 I characterize this lack of access as, 
in itself, part of the psychic shielding offered to these sub-
jects, just as the wall is placed around the mine’s valuable 
resources. Methodologically, I am left to peruse the assem-
blage of corporate discourses, legal tactics, social technolo-
gies such as community consultations, and the installation 
of security and surveillance systems as a collection of mir-
rors through which something of the psychology of the 
displacer is reflected, can be discerned, and is tentatively 
theorized. Indeed, the extensive, interlocking nature of this 
assemblage is some indication of the depth of psychic risk 
to “displacers.”
Directing the gaze to this dominant, ostensibly secured 
figure is not intended to marginalize or disregard the 
experiences of those who have been displaced; rather, it is 
intended to generate some further insights into the pro-
cesses that continue to make tenable colonialist systems of 
domination in a formally post-colonial era. I draw on the 
idea of the wall as a metaphor for contemporary colonial 
binaries, and on the actual material existence of the fence/
wall around portions of the North Mara mine site, as con-
ceptual locations from which to consider the psychological 
dimensions of displacement as embodied in the displacers. 
In drawing attention to the micro-investments and tensions 
at the level of individual psyches in such operations, I offer 
a more comprehensive assessment of what is at stake and 
what would have to be transformed in order to respond to 
and realize what Ranjana Khanna terms “the call of justice 
for the future.”3 
Setting the Context: The North Mara Gold Mine
Mining in Tanzania predated the colonial era, then 
attracted the attention of both the German and British col-
onial rulers.4 In 1979, under Nyerere’s governance, a min-
ing law was introduced that encouraged local Tanzanian 
mining of gemstones, gold, and other metals and minerals.5 
During the 1980s and 1990s, hundreds of thousands of 
Tanzanians took up employment as what came to be called 
“small-scale” or “artisanal” miners, principally in the Lake 
Victoria “gold belt” region in northern Tanzania. A USAID 
study published in 2001 indicated not only that by 1995, 
some 550,000 Tanzanians made their living at least partially 
from small-scale mining, but that this economic activity 
had played a surprisingly significant role in reducing pov-
erty.6 The advent of structural adjustment programs in the 
context of economic liberalization advocated by the World 
Bank and other Western donors led to the adoption of a new, 
foreign-investment-friendly mining code in 1998.7 Among 
other elements, such as tax concessions and the elimina-
tion of “performance requirements” (e.g., local sourcing; 
employment of nationals), the new law allowed total owner-
ship of mines by foreign companies. In response, a number 
of Canadian and other foreign mining and mining-explor-
ation companies entered Tanzania. By the early 2000s sev-
eral major foreign-owned industrial gold mines were oper-
ating—Bulyanhulu (ABG), North Mara (ABG), Tulawaka 
(ABG), Buzwagi (ABG), Geita (AngloGold Ashanti), Golden 
Pride (Resolute)—in areas where, in most cases, Tanzanian 
artisanal miners had been active. 
There continue to be conflicting assessments regarding 
the benefits to the nation of artisanal mining versus for-
eign-investment-led industrial mining. While it is beyond 
the scope of this paper to address this question in depth, a 
brief synopsis helps to set the context for understanding cir-
cumstances at North Mara. On one side, it is asserted that 
artisanal mining employs a vastly greater number of people 
and sees far more of the revenues reinvested in local com-
munities and economies, as well as in the national economy, 
and is thus more significant in terms of poverty-reduction.8 
By contrast, advocates of foreign-owned industrial mining 
argue that the smaller number of jobs provided are safer 
and pay better, that there are far greater tax revenues that 
go into government coffers, and that industrial mining is 
able to access the resource at greater depths than can arti-
sanal methods. Both sides accuse the other of illicit and 
illegal financial practices that reduce the revenues available 
to the nation (for example, smuggling on the part of arti-
sanals;9 corporate accounting practices that reduce taxes 
and other fees payable by foreign companies to the “host” 
government).10 
The North Mara gold mine, owned initially by Afrika 
Masharki Gold Mines, an Australian company, came into 
production in 2002. It was acquired in 2003 by Placer Dome 
Tanzania (wholly owned by Vancouver-based Placer Dome 
Inc. of Canada), which in turn was acquired in 2006 by 
Barrick Gold Inc. In 2010 Barrick Gold created a separate 
company, African Barrick Gold (ABG), which is 74 per cent 
owned by Barrick. The North Mara Gold Mine is currently 
owned by ABG. The mine consisted initially of one open pit, 
the Nyabirama pit, with two additional pits, the Nyabigena 
and Gokona pits, subsequently opened. In 2011, production 
at North Mara was reported at 170,000 ounces of gold, at a 
production cost of US$810/ounce;11 at that time, gold was 
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selling in the range of US$1,900 an ounce. The value of gold 
produced in one year from the North Mara mine alone was 
thus in the range of US$170 million. 
There are a number of communities located in the vicin-
ity of the pits, with the urbanized town of Nyangoto, at the 
edge of the Nyabirama pit, being the largest. The area is 
reported to be unique in that there was historically little in-
migration to engage in mining; rather, most of the artisanal 
miners and local citizens are ethnically Wakuria, born in 
the area or indigenous to the area for generations. This sug-
gests that there was considerable local sense of ownership of 
the territory and its resources, and it may explain why, from 
the arrival of the foreign companies in this mining area up 
to the present, there has been continuing discontent, com-
plaints, and opposition from local community members. 
While the number of Canadians and other expatri-
ates who are employed by North Mara Gold Mine is rela-
tively modest (approximately 15 per cent of the workforce, 
which totalled 2,329 employees in 2011),12 the company is 
perceived as Canadian and signifies the installation of a 
Canadian presence in Tanzania. Its operation and expan-
sion has been financed largely by capital raised on Canadian 
stock markets, as well as, since 2010, on the London Stock 
Exchange, where ABG is listed. Moreover, to the extent that 
Canada is perceived as a “white man country” with a British 
heritage, this presence assumes racialized dimensions with 
relatively recent historical colonial associations. I suggest 
that such associations subtend the chronic conflicts that 
have occurred at North Mara.
The first major traumas experienced by local residents 
due to the arrival of foreign mining companies were the 
land appropriations and forced evictions. A study funded 
by a global mining industry association, the International 
Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM), presents the 
history:
Mineral rights to some of the land required for the Nyabirama and 
Nyabigena pits was acquired by means of agreements with hold-
ers of mining claims—11 mineral rights holders at Nyabirama 
and five villages and two individual mineral rights holders at 
Nyabigena, as well as surface rights holders … 
The majority of land required was compulsorily acquired from 
over 500 surface rights holders who were relocated, over a number 
of years, to allow the mine and its infrastructure to be built. Over 
one thousand others were also compensated for loss of crops or 
surface improvements on land which was needed for roads, the 
airstrip or other mine infrastructure.13
Another account of these events appears in a com-
plaint lodged by the Lawyers Environmental Action Team 
(LEAT), with the Tanzanian Commission for Human 
Rights and Good Governance. LEAT’s “Complaint relating 
to Violations of Fundamental Rights and Duties Arising 
from Forced Evictions of Artisanal Miners from Afrika 
Mashariki Gold Mine, Tarime” described the events in 
graphic terms:
On or about August 6, 2001, a heavily armed police Field Force 
Unit (“FFU”) squadron … invaded the complainants’ villages 
and, after four days of armed operations, violently drove the com-
plainants out of their settlements and properties at Nyabigena 
and Nyabirama. During this violent operation, the said FFU 
squadron shot and wounded numerous villagers and—in col-
laboration with employees, workmen and/or agents of EAGM / 
Afrika Mashariki—destroyed the complainants’ residential and 
commercial houses, mine workings, equipment, farms and grow-
ing crops. In addition, as a result of the said violent and forced 
evictions, EAGM / Afrika Mashariki took possession of the 
Nyabigena and Nyabirama sites including the properties lawfully 
held and owned by the complainants and have, since November 
2002, operated the Afrika Mashariki Mine. At no point before, 
during or after the forced evictions did EAGM / Afrika Mashariki 
ever pay or offer to pay just, fair and reasonable compensation to 
the complainants for losses arising out of, or connected with, the 
forced evictions. At no point before, or subsequent to, the evic-
tions did EAGM / Afrika Mashariki prepare or plan, finance or 
implement any resettlement or relocation plan or provide alterna-
tive lands; complainants, their families and dependants have been 
forced to live in great hardship. The combined loss suffered by the 
complainants as a result of these actions or omissions is conserva-
tively estimated at Tanzania Shillings 50,920,000,000 (fifty billion, 
nine hundred and twenty million only) at the 1996 value of the 
Tanzania Shillings.14
Despite the assertion in the ICMM-funded study that 
“compensation has been processed for all landholders and 
lease and claim holders, which is designed to offset the 
inconvenience of loss of land,”15 there are other indications 
that many of the claims for compensation for these and sub-
sequent losses remain unresolved. African Barrick Gold’s 
Responsible Mining Report 2012 notes that of 443 grievances 
filed with ABG in 2012, 396 were lodged at the North Mara 
mine, where “the majority of new grievances continue to 
relate to historic land compensation matters.”16 
Having been displaced from the gold-rich areas, or lack-
ing other sources of comparable income, many youth and 
adults “scavenge” for gold among the rock piles at the per-
imeter of the mine property. In some places, the original 
fence around the site had been torn down. These circum-
stances led to recurrent confrontations with security guards 
and police seconded to guard the mine. In 2005, two deaths 
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were reported; in 2006 another villager was shot by police; 
in 2008 a young man was shot by a security guard;17 in 
2011 five young men aged 25–35, among a large number 
of people hunting for gold-bearing ore at the perimeter 
of the mine, were shot and killed;18 and two more deaths 
at North Mara Gold Mine, under similar circumstances, 
were reported in March 2013.19 On several occasions, the 
deaths triggered mass protests from local community mem-
bers who invaded the mine and caused extensive damage. 
Many arrests ensued. Moreover, a number of cases of sexual 
assault, allegedly perpetrated by North Mara mine secur-
ity, were reported.20 In addition, environmental complaints 
related to spills, contamination of the local river, and con-
sequent ill health had been made. In response, a 2009 study 
investigating the presence of trace metal concentrations 
in local soil and water sources, conducted jointly by the 
Norwegian University of Life Sciences and the University 
of Dar es Salaam, Department of Botany, found evidence 
of high levels of arsenic and expressed concern regarding 
the lack of protection of local food and water sources from 
mine-related contamination.21
Although this paper is not focused directly on the impact 
of all these events on the members of local communities, 
such impacts have been documented by, among others, 
Tanzania’s Legal and Human Rights Centre22 and Canadian 
documentary photographer Allan Lissner, who reports, 
Since the mine opened in 2002, the Mwita family say that they live 
in a state of constant anxiety because they have been repeatedly 
harassed and intimidated by the mine’s private security forces 
and by government police. There have been several deadly con-
frontations in the area and every time there are problems at the 
mine, the Mwita family say their compound is the first place the 
police come looking. During police operations the family scatters 
in fear to hide in the bush, “like fugitives,” for weeks at a time 
waiting for the situation to calm down. They used to farm and 
raise livestock, “but now there are no pastures because the mine 
has almost taken the whole of the land … we have no sources of 
income and we are living only through God’s wishes … We had 
never experienced poverty before the mine came here.” They say 
they would like to be relocated, but the application process has 
been complicated, and they feel the amount of compensation they 
have been offered is ‘candy.’”23
The accumulation of complaints at North Mara culmin-
ated most recently in the decision of 12 local residents to 
launch a civil law suit. On 30 July 2013, Leigh Day, a British 
law firm, filed proceedings in the United Kingdom High 
Court against African Barrick Gold and North Mara Gold 
Mine Ltd. for “deaths and injuries.”24 The allegations, which 
have yet to be tested in court, are vigorously denied by the 
companies.
Of course, the company actively responded to all these 
events and problems, not only with “enhanced secur-
ity” projects but with a number of widely publicized com-
munity outreach and community development programs. 
The North Mara Co-Existence Plan encompasses Village 
Benefits Implementation Agreements that have been signed 
with seven villages in the region. These agreements, total-
ling some $8.5 million over a three-year period (with likely 
prospects of a second three-year tranche at similar fund-
ing levels), typically feature provision of school infrastruc-
ture, access to water supply, upgraded health services, 
road improvements, and electricity supply. The company 
also supports community projects through its Maendaleo 
Fund, which is financed at $10 million/year and touted as 
the largest such development fund in Tanzania. According 
to ABG’s Responsible Mining Report 2012, $1.4 million was 
spent on community development projects in the vicinity 
of the North Mara mine. A non-governmental organization 
called CanEducate, created by ABG employees, raised a fur-
ther $127,000 for educational projects in 2012. In a discus-
sion about events (particularly the number of deaths) at the 
North Mara Gold Mine in the British House of Lords on 
26 November 2013, it was noted that the British high com-
missioner to Tanzania had visited North Mara and learned 
that “up to $12 million-worth has been spent on corporate 
social responsibility, including healthcare centres, schools 
and water boreholes.”25 The company also contracted the 
services of a conflict-resolution agency, Search for Common 
Ground, to provide human rights and conflict-reduction 
training with police, security personnel, and other relevant 
community groups.26
“Forting Up”: Walls, Displacement, and Neo-
colonial Power
Population displacement and the rise of “gated commun-
ities” have been identified as phenomena that often char-
acterize contemporary capitalist “globalization.”27 The 
emergence of gated communities, featuring walls, secur-
ity cameras, alarms, and private guards—a phenomenon 
Dupuis and Thorns call “forting up”28—is explained as a 
fear of crime and feelings of insecurity in contexts of both 
growing affluence of the elite class, and growing economic 
disparity. While there are occasional reports of benefits to 
neighbouring poor communities,29 much of the literature 
on gating identifies it as a classed and raced bunker mental-
ity, an exclusionary choice on the part of a dominant class to 
“not know” how the Other actually lives and to accede to a 
comfortable existence of non-awareness and non-account-
ability. While Dupuis and Thorns analyze the phenomenon 
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as a psychological response to risk—with allusions to the 
walled forts erected by European colonizers—they do not 
explicitly extend their analysis of the psychology of risk to 
the risks that could be deemed inherent in a global order 
characterized by racialized structural inequality rooted in 
colonial histories of land and resource appropriation. It is 
the anxiety of the historical “usurper” that I posit as a prob-
lem to be managed for the contemporary subject secured 
inside the walls (literally and figuratively) at the North 
Mara Gold Mine.
As was clear during European imperialism, there is often 
a direct correspondence between gating/forting, territorial 
incursions, and population displacements. In the context of 
the neo-liberal development model, foreign-investment-led 
industrial mining is understood to foster economic growth 
and thus contribute to poverty reduction. For such reasons, 
local population displacements are deemed a reasonable 
trade-off, given the economic benefits that are purported to 
accrue to the nation and the local region. The challenge then 
is to design effective methods for the movement of popula-
tions, resettlement, and compensation packages in order to 
maintain a “social licence” to operate. However, the empir-
ical evidence demonstrating the incidence of increased 
impoverishment resulting from development-induced dis-
placement has been sobering. Cernea notes that payments 
of compensation to those who have been displaced are 
“universally insufficient and inherently prone to distortion”; 
this results in “project-induced impoverishment.”30 He cites 
likely risks from displacement as encompassing landless-
ness, joblessness, homelessness, marginalization, increased 
morbidity and mortality, educational losses, food insecurity, 
loss of common property, and social disarticulation.31 He 
notes that “if resettlers become worse off, it is nearly always 
an indicator that project costs have not been properly inter-
nalised. They have been transferred to resettlers, who end 
up poorer than they were before the project” (and who 
could therefore, he adds, be regarded as investors—albeit 
involuntary ones—in the mining project).32 Still, despite 
Cernea’s important recognition of the cultural, social, and 
psychological dimensions of the experience of displacement 
for those displaced, the problem of displacement remains 
primarily technical—a matter of “getting it right.”
Anti-colonial, post-colonial, critical race, and Marxist 
scholars bring a different explanatory framework to indus-
trial-mining-related displacement. European-dominated 
global mining—or “predatory extractivism”33—is situated 
as a classic instance of (in Marxist terminology) “primi-
tive accumulation,” both a foundational and continuing 
requirement of the expanding capitalist system.34 Thus the 
account of the lands at North Mara that were “compulsorily 
acquired” from local Tanzanian citizens by Euro-Western 
mining companies exemplifies the logic and historical prac-
tice of primitive accumulation. Racist colonial attitudes and 
the application of colonial power—by definition non-demo-
cratic and fascist—facilitated primitive accumulation in 
the past, but clear continuities are identified in the present. 
What this suggests is that primitive accumulation cannot be 
temporally associated with a brutal past era of colonialism 
and overt racism that has ended, but rather that colonialist 
power relations persist in the present. This was first recog-
nized by Kwame Nkrumah, who in 1965 coined the term 
“neo-colonialism”35 with reference to continued European 
domination of the African continental mining sector, and 
was more recently identified by Bohm and Misoczky who 
assert, with reference to their study of local resistance to 
the Alumbrera mine in Argentina, “Neocolonialism is pre-
cisely what we think is going on here: the term emphasizes 
repetition with difference, a regeneration of colonialism 
through other means.”36 From this perspective, population 
displacements are a kind of collateral damage of primitive 
accumulation, a form of structural violence that mani-
fests in people’s actual lives as illness, stress, unemploy-
ment, poverty, and reduced longevity. Banerjee coined the 
term “necrocapitalism” to capture the death-dealing effects 
of such processes.37 What this indicates, additionally, is 
that the characteristics of colonial state-corporate power—
bureaucratic, militarized, racist, and non-democratic or 
fascist—persist in thin disguise in some expressions of the 
modern state. Coloniality may be far less an aberration, 
or “state of exception,” vis-à-vis the Enlightenment state 
of democracy, equality, and human rights, than is custom-
arily assumed. Indeed, having analyzed Nazism from the 
perspective of Europe’s colonies, Aimé Césaire38 challenged 
the supposed exceptionality of European fascism and sug-
gested that a fascist/colonialist exercise of power lies in wait, 
as an ultimate possibility, in the shadows of the Western lib-
eral democratic capitalist state. Thus colonial violence can 
be anticipated—and should not come as a surprise—in neo-
liberal modernity.
Psychic Dimensions of Neo-colonialism
This gives rise to questions about the kind of psychic ten-
sion and distress such a system must engender, and an 
appreciation for the elaborate socio-cultural architecture 
that must be constructed to obscure neo-colonial power 
and relations of domination, to garner consent and par-
ticipation. How can the displacer, occupying a position of 
whiteness—in which whiteness, according to Tifsberger,39 
is “a history of seizure”—be enabled not to feel distressed or 
to implode psychologically? In fact, the psychological and 
social processes required to inure colonizers or displacers 
against the traumatic knowledge of colonial-racial violence 
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have been developed over several centuries and are finely 
engrained in Western epistemology and culture. Bergland, 
Loomba,40 and Tifsberger, among others, identify psychol-
ogy and psychoanalysis as a colonial discipline: as a new 
field of knowledge that emerged at the cusp of European 
colonialism (early 1900s) and was infused with the racial-
colonial imaginary of colonialism. From this perspective, 
psychoanalysis could be interpreted as a social technology 
of psychic harm–reduction and management: if the source 
of psychoses could be located and fixed in the private realm 
of individual experience (especially childhood and experi-
ences in the nuclear family, typically understood through a 
Eurocentric, Western lens) then historical socio-economic 
and political causes of psychic anxiety and distress could 
be denied. 
Scholars such as Nelson, Chrisman, and Bergland41 
explored the collective psychological impact and psychic 
adaptations of colonizer subjects in relation to British imper-
ialism in Africa and the colonization of America. In their 
work, land appropriation is identified as a central source of 
psychological uneasiness, sometimes manifested in night-
mares and the prevalence of (“Indian”) ghost stories.42 
Welch43 investigates how Alexis de Tocqueville, a leading 
19th-century French theorist of liberalism, and author of 
Democracy in America, managed the “cognitive dissonance” 
produced by the contradiction between his own liberal val-
ues—of which private property rights, and their legal pro-
tection, was central—and the atrocities perpetrated by the 
French military against Algerian peasants during the mid-
1800s. These atrocities included mass killings of Algerian 
civilians and land seizures.44 Welch notes that Tocqueville 
repressed recognition of the rights of indigenous popula-
tions in Algeria, developed “patterns of evasion” and a prac-
tice of mental “absenting” in which “atrocious events [that] 
cannot be reasonably accommodated in any larger schema 
of the political imagination … must … be made ‘absent’ to 
that imagination.”45 In The Wretched of the Earth, Fanon 
provides an account of a French-Algerian settler employed 
as a torturer of Algerian prisoners; this man came to Dr. 
Fanon for psychiatric treatment as he had become violent 
with his own wife and children. Fanon observes, “As he 
could not see his way to stop torturing people (that made 
nonsense to him for in that case he would have to resign) 
he asked me without beating about the bush to help him 
go on torturing Algerian patriots without any prickings 
of conscience, without any behaviour problems, and with 
complete equanimity.”46 
This “patient” wished to repress knowledge of his role in 
colonial domination in order to continue to reap its benefits 
(in this case, stable employment and livelihood). Colonial 
relations of domination appear to require dominant subjects 
to deny, block, suppress, or reframe the knowledge that 
they are harming (or killing) others, or enjoying what may 
rightfully belong to others. Lastly, racialization has proved 
central to these processes. As indicated earlier, Tifsberger47 
identifies “whiteness” as “a history of seizure”—a synonym, 
certainly, for “primitive accumulation.” She asserts that 
such history is embedded in the white psyche, where it rests 
as an “unconscious memory of threat” that creates a “blank 
space”—a determined absence of knowledge of imperialist 
harm—that functions to protect and stabilize whiteness. 
Walled-in at North Mara: Technologies of Protection
Contemporary global mining is thus situated in a web of 
unresolved historical trauma associated with colonial and 
racial violence; as such, it, too, requires and produces a 
range of psychic manoeuvres on the part of its participants. 
Without denying the individual agency of the displacers, I 
suggest that these subjects are collectively assisted and pro-
tected by an elaborate social, legal, and discursive architec-
ture designed to make them (us) not know, not feel, not have 
to recognize, and not to have to be fully accountable for the 
meaning and effects of their (our) presence. This structure, 
which obscures its own foundations in order to garner con-
sent and participation, demonstrates several common fea-
tures: (1) the use of law as hegemonic power, (2) racialized 
representations of Self versus Other, (3) seemingly apolitical 
managerial and social technologies (e.g., “village benefit 
agreements”) packaged in progressive discourses (e.g., “cor-
porate social responsibility”), and (4) the alignment of the 
“global South host state” with the interests of foreign capital. 
Such scaffolding protects the psyche of the colonizer/displa-
cer and in turn secures the neo-liberal-colonialist resource 
extraction project. 
Central to such psychic self-preservation is a strategy of 
ambiguity, dissemblance, and porosity. This strategy oper-
ates as a unifying logic drawing together the disparate 
elements identified above. For instance, the concrete wall 
proposed at the North Mara Gold Mine shortly after the 
deaths of 16 May 2011 would have replaced the existing 
fence that had proved to be too permeable and porous; it 
had gaps, places where the fence had been pulled down, 
and where people—local artisanal miners, for instance—
could get through and obtain some partial access to the 
resource.48 The fence with gaps, the porous fence, as it were, 
presents a model for the psychic stance preferred by the 
neo-liberal subject who occupies a place inside the walled 
mine. If awareness of lack of personal integrity is one of 
the psychic traumas that must be eliminated in order for 
displacers to continue their work, what becomes necessary 
is the establishment of a “grey zone,” a political-discursive 
space of ambiguity and possibility in which the integrity of 
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the colonizer/displacer subject appears feasible.49 The para-
digm of the porous fence enables the displacer to participate 
simultaneously in walling out the illegalized Other, while 
engaging hierarchically with the Other as a benefactor. The 
porosity thus preserves space for the displacers to assert their 
goodness and civility—to hide and erase from memory and 
view their foundational illegitimacy, and to naturalize their 
presence in a pseudo-state role as provider of social servi-
ces: health, education, water supply, electricity, roads, etc. 
This is, however, a deliberately duplicitous and ambiguous 
stance, as the gesture of kindliness and “win-win scenarios” 
(as symbolized by the Village Benefits Agreements, and dis-
bursements from the Maendaleo Fund) vis-à-vis those who 
have been displaced and dispossessed is always, in the final 
instance, conditioned by the possibility of erecting a solid, 
impervious wall topped with electrified barbed wire and 
monitored by closed-circuit television. Symbolically, this 
indicates the absolute right, on the part of the white cap-
italist investor, to the resource. The question as to whether 
the colonizers/displacers is conscious of the effect of their 
actions—do they know what they are doing, or have they 
successfully suppressed and re-narrated such knowledge—
remains productively open, porous, and indeterminable. 
This is a necessary aspect of neo-liberal authority. The con-
struction of a more impermeable wall—the “forting up” 
process—is accompanied paradoxically by a simultaneous 
acceleration of community outreach programs50 including, 
as noted earlier, the hiring of a significantly named NGO, 
Search for Common Ground. Ironically, the erection of the 
concrete, barbed-wire-topped wall eliminates any actual 
“common ground” and effectively proclaims the foreign 
mining company’s assertion of legal title to the concession 
and entitlement to Tanzanian gold. The physical porosity of 
the failed fence gives way now to a narrative and imaginary 
of porosity: the idea that the company can both wall out the 
local people and engage the local people in life-enhancing 
social programming. It is this duality that offers psychic 
protection to the displacer.
Paradoxically, the notion of porosity acknowledges the 
agency of the displaced populations. It is these populations 
who have broken down sections of the pre-existing fence 
in order to assert and acquire their means to live; it is their 
continuous resistance and refusal of the conditions and 
effects of displacement that have compelled the foreign-
owned mine to engage in the host of actions itemized ear-
lier, ranging from building a stronger wall, to contracting 
a consulting firm to develop conflict-resolution approaches, 
to directing some of the mine’s profit to meeting local com-
munity needs. Unsatisfied with the response to date from 
the company, and perhaps in response subconsciously to 
what is symbolized by the concrete barbed-wire-topped 
wall, a group of twelve community members launched the 
legal suit mentioned earlier. These subjects may have lost 
loved ones and income, but they have not become defeated 
victims. The local community members’ continuing mem-
ory of displacement, frustration, refusal, anger, and outrage 
at the injustices experienced is a major historical force driv-
ing events at this site. It is this anger and refusal that con-
tinuously batters both the fence/wall and the mythologies 
and discourses established to protect the displacers’ psycho-
logical comfort and sense of integrity. However, the erection 
of the more impervious wall also signals a loss for the mil-
itant community members who have neither recovered their 
land nor forced out the foreigners, but are now subjected to 
a more intensified process of pacification (i.e., via the vari-
ous community development projects and programs) and 
an aggressive response to their litigation.
Metaphorically, the porosity of the fence and of rela-
tions of power within the neo-liberal-colonialist context 
also provokes insights concerning the racial ambiguity of 
the displacer. As some 86 per cent of the mine employees 
at North Mara are national citizens—Tanzanians—the 
displacer figure is not always or necessarily a phenotypic-
ally white or expatriate subject, although it is a subject that 
occupies a position of racial dominance in the system of 
globalized capitalist resource extraction. In speaking of the 
“displacer,” I assign much less complicity to those employed 
in working-class positions—i.e., the majority of Tanzanians 
employed at the mine—and rather look to those in profes-
sional, management, and senior roles, and, primarily, to 
the less-visible head office employees, company directors, 
and shareholders. In order to cut operating costs, ABG is 
intent on increased “localization” of professional employees. 
Over time, there will be fewer phenotypically white bodies 
in managerial, professional, and senior positions (although 
the Board of Directors and shareholders will remain over-
whelmingly white). Similarly, many of the security officers 
and most police—those most likely to chase away or pull the 
trigger on locals accused of trespassing, stealing, etc.—are 
Tanzanians. A classic strategy of neo-liberalism is the blur-
ring of what W. E. B. Dubois called “the colour line”;51 thus, 
the recruitment of Black Tanzanians into a colonial project 
of whiteness-as-seizure is another instance of the strategy 
of ambiguous porosity. This is a reinvention and redeploy-
ment of the older British strategy of “indirect rule” but one 
that still enables the white colonizer/displacer to remain 
invisibly in control, appropriate the bulk of the wealth, and 
simultaneously claim a position of innocence and benevo-
lence. This guarantees psychic protection for phenotypic-
ally white employees (white Canadian or expatriates from 
another country including white South Africans) who can 
distance themselves from both overt and covert violence 
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and maintain a sense of themselves as “civilized,” peace-
keepers, etc. For example, it is still the white mine manager 
and his wife who appear in the media photo ops shaking 
hands with local village residents at the time of the signing 
of the Village Benefits Implementation Agreement.52 This 
subject can freely move outside the fence/wall into the sur-
rounding communities and in so doing resecures his own 
sense of innocence, goodness, and psychological comfort. 
He can thus avoid confronting and coming to terms with 
any fundamental injustice related to his presence. 
Despite Canada’s (highly ironic) official claims to have 
never been a colonizing power, Canada is an identifiable col-
onialist presence in Tanzanian gold mining. Tanzania is a 
formally independent nation, and Canada does not formally 
or directly govern the country; however, as the home-state 
to many of the companies that initiated the expansion of 
industrial mining in Tanzania since at least the mid-1990s, 
Canada plays a very influential role. Canadian diplomats and 
company executives participated in the drafting of the 1998 
mining law. That input has been partially moderated with 
the introduction of the new 2010 mining law, even while 
some provisions from 1998 continue to protect compan-
ies’ interests.53 Canadian companies dominate Tanzania’s 
mining sector, which has positioned Tanzania as one of the 
most important emerging gold-producing countries globally. 
A Canadian company is managing the development of 
Tanzania’s first uranium mine.54 Canada recently signed a 
bilateral foreign investment protection treaty (FIPA) with 
Tanzania, the terms of which offer strong protections against 
expropriation and international dispute-resolution mechan-
isms for Canadian private investors in Tanzania—with very 
little likelihood of reciprocal benefit for Tanzanian invest-
ors in Canada.55 Indeed, this FIPA could be regarded as 
designed to be a hedge against the slightly more national-
istic content of the revised 2010 mining act—content that 
reflected increased popular demands from the Tanzanian 
citizenry to benefit from the country’s mining wealth. As an 
investment destination, however, Canada touts Tanzania as 
an exemplary African country.56 
This backing by law, by the free market legal framework, 
offers “displacers” a sense of entitlement, security, and thus 
a certain peace of mind. As a sign of rationality and fairness, 
the law can remain unquestioned and unidentified as a class- 
and race-based relation and strategy of power.57 Indeed, the 
neo-colonialist legal framework—despite the considerable 
outlay of time and energy required to introduce it—becomes 
naturalized and universalized. Laws deployed to secure the 
rights of the displacer to be present and to extract wealth 
are presented in the terms of a naturalized rationality that 
anaesthetizes and thus soothes the psyche of the displacer. 
As a white settler state, Canada has an established history 
of hiding or recasting its colonial practices.58 As Canada’s 
mining industry has rapidly expanded globally in the past 
25 years, the Canadian state and mining industry have 
been vigorously engaged in countering charges of harm 
and representing Canada as a benefactor vis-à-vis mining-
region populations. Exemplifying this agenda is the contro-
versial decision, announced in early 2012, to provide multi-
million-dollar aid funding for Canadian NGOs delivering 
community development programs in partnership with 
Canadian mining companies, in communities adjacent to 
the mines, as well as the creation by the federal govern-
ment of the $25-million Canadian International Institute 
for Extractive Industries and Development. As a discourse 
and set of now-routine institutional practices, “corporate 
social responsibility” (CSR) has been a central compon-
ent of these objectives. In relation to the North Mara Gold 
Mine, the expanding set of community-focused programs—
the Village Benefits Agreements, North Mara Co-existence 
Plan, Maendaleo Fund, social benefits programming, con-
flict-reduction training, sports programs, etc.—is evidence 
of the importance now placed by AGB on “securing a social 
licence”—i.e., gaining the acceptance or acquiescence of the 
local populations to their presence. Such initiatives, along 
with the government-funded programs mentioned, can be 
understood as part of the cultural-psychological scaffolding 
required to inure colonizer-displacers against both appre-
hension of and shock at structural violence of grotesque 
proportions. Individual displacers can rather identify with 
these programs of ostensible goodness, benevolence, and 
civility, and can reference these initiatives to protect their/
our own psyches both in relation to their/our own sense of 
self/sense of integrity and in relation to others’ demands for 
accountability. 
Finally, in the context of Canada’s globalized mining 
industry, the assertion of Canadian goodness is secured to 
a significant degree through counter-posing those “African 
Others” (e.g., artisanal miners) who challenge and resist the 
Canadian mining presence as lawless, criminal, violent, and 
savage. Through this representational move, the displacer 
subjects are enabled to feel secure in the justice of their pres-
ence on the land and their access to the valuable mineral 
resource.59 For example, in attempting to contextualize the 
frequent conflicts at the North Mara site, the company’s 
webpage presents the area as a rough, lawless place, a kind 
of “wild west” zone: “Among Barrick’s operations and affili-
ates, the Mara region of Tanzania, in which African Barrick 
Gold (ABG) owns and operates the North Mara mine, is 
especially challenging. The North Mara mine is located in 
a very remote, underdeveloped part of the country in close 
proximity to the Kenyan border. In-migration from other 
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areas and countries is rampant and law enforcement cap-
acity is limited, making the area a magnet for transients, 
criminals and organized crime. Civil unrest due to poverty 
is a particular problem in the area, a fact widely recognized 
by Tanzanian authorities.”60
Along the same line, an employee of the NGO, Search for 
Common Ground, contracted by the mine to develop con-
flict-reduction strategies with local community members, 
describes the local Kuria culture: “It is a warrior culture and 
many local men join the military.”61 Such statements can 
be seen to subtly evoke deeply entrenched racist imagery in 
Euro-American culture in which a series of cultural-psych-
ological associations fall into place: warrior, violent, crim-
inal, savage, primitive, incompetent. In short order, such 
subjects are rendered illegitimate, such that their displace-
ment and redirection into other kinds of simplistic eco-
nomic activities (“micro-enterprise”) can be regarded not as 
an injustice but rather as a reasonable manner of handling a 
militant or defiant population.
Conclusion
By introducing a micro-psychological dimension, I have 
suggested that what is at stake for displacers is both material 
advantage and psychic well-being. Transformative justice 
appears to threaten both. I am aware that throughout this 
discussion the central figures, the displacers, have remained 
blurred, indistinct, and abstracted. They/we—all share-
holders, for instance—are not clearly seen and not directly 
heard. Yet, as I suggested at the outset, this very obscurity 
may be a necessary dimension of the scaffolding offered 
to these subjects. They/we must not be put in a position of 
having to answer for, or speak for, themselves/ourselves; 
rather, they/we are ensconced behind, and assigned phrases 
through, an elaborate system of scaffolding, consisting of, 
as I have shown, legal discourses and practices, mytholo-
gies of Canadian goodness, progressiveness, and benevo-
lence, discourses of CSR, and social technologies such as 
Village Benefits Agreements that seem to disavow histories 
of dispossession. This elaborate psychic scaffolding allows 
them/us metaphorically to scale the wall, to leave the walled 
mine, and rub shoulders in a friendly manner with the local 
community members, while retaining the security the wall 
affords. The wall “walls out” undesirables; it does not “wall 
in” the privileged. The mobility of the latter is guaranteed. 
In thinking through the multiple meanings of the erec-
tion of the stronger security wall at the North Mara Gold 
Mine—a response to local invasions, protest, refusal, and 
deaths—I have also suggested that neo-colonial power 
develops new techniques for garnering consent to structural 
violence, resource appropriation, and domination: specific-
ally, porosity as subterfuge. Thus, the barbed-wire-topped 
concrete wall is not a sign of theft, greed, and ruthlessness, 
but a sign of life for the populations in the vicinity of the 
North Mara Gold Mine. Countering this narrative, it is still 
possible to imagine that the alternative to mining-induced 
displacement and impoverishment is not a better technical 
solution or more community development programs to 
acquire the “social licence” from what Cernea charmingly 
calls “resettlers” (i.e., rather than displaced populations), 
but a transformed power relation that recognizes indigen-
ous/local peoples’ (and global South host states’) substan-
tive right to self-determination and alterity in livelihood 
models.62 This is precisely what is feared, the risk that must 
be eliminated. It is in response to this “fear of justice” that 
the porous wall is replaced by an impermeable concrete wall. 
A strongly protective foreign investment protection “agree-
ment” is leveraged into place. Aggressive legal responses are 
made to civil litigation. These are not necessarily the dis-
placers’ preferred choices, but they are enacted when that is 
what is required to counter the justice-demanding energy of 
the displaced, to preserve access to lucrative resources, and 
to protect the displacers from psychic implosion. Inside the 
walls, the protected “displacer” subjects continue to appre-
hend themselves/ourselves as good people with kind hearts—
much in the style of Fanon’s French-Algerian torturer of 
Arab-Algerian patriots. Such strategies serve to intercept 
and declaw demands for the displacers to depart, to cede 
territory, lands, and resources back to those who were dis-
placed and dispossessed. It is this action that, from the col-
onizer’s perspective, can never be seriously considered. 
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